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Abstract 
People spontaneously gesture when they speak (co-speech gesture) and when they solve 
problems silently (co-thought gesture). In this study, we first explored the relationship 
between these two types of gestures and found that individuals who produced co-thought 
gestures more frequently also produced co-speech gestures more frequently (Experiments 
1 and 2). This suggests that the two types of gestures are generated from the same process. 
We then investigated whether both types of gestures can be generated from the 
representational use of the action generation process that also generates purposeful 
actions that have a direct physical impact on the world, such as manipulating an object or 
locomotion (the action generation hypothesis). To this end, we examined the effect of 
object affordances on the production of both types of gestures (Experiments 3 and 4). We 
found that individuals produced co-thought and co-speech gestures more often when the 
stimulus objects afforded action (objects with smooth surface) than when they did not 
(objects with spiky surface). These results support the action generation hypothesis for 
representational gestures. However, our findings are incompatible with the hypotheses 
that co-speech representational gestures are solely generated from the speech production 
process (the speech production hypothesis). 
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When speaking, people often spontaneously produce hand gestures (co-speech 
gestures). In this paper, we focus on gestures that depict actions, motions, and shapes, or 
gestures that point to a referent. These are called representational gestures (McNeill, 1992; 
Kita, 2000). Throughout this paper, we use the term gesture to refer specifically to 
representational gesture. 
The production of co-speech gesture is tightly linked to speech production 
(McNeill, 1992). The way people verbally express a motion event affects the way they 
gesturally depict it (Kita & Özyürek, 2003). Prohibiting or allowing gesture can alter 
children’s verbal explanations of Piagetian conservation tasks (Alibali & Kita, 2010), 
adults' choice of syntactic frames to express motion events (Mol & Kita, 2012), and their 
speech fluency in verbal descriptions with spatial contents (Rauscher, Krauss & Chen, 
1996).  
The tight link between co-speech gesture and speech has led some researchers to 
claim that co-speech gestures are solely generated from the speech production process. 
We call this class of hypotheses the speech production hypothesis. For example, the 
Growth Point Theory (McNeill, 1992, 2005, 2012) proposed that co-speech gesture and 
speech originate from the same representation, that is, from the same “growth point” (i.e., 
the minimal idea unit that combines images and words) during speaking. The Sketch 
Model (de Ruiter, 2000; de Ruiter & de Beer, 2013) proposed that co-speech gestures and 
speech are based on the same communicative intention. Co-speech gestures are generated 
in the conceptualization phase (Levelt, 1989) of speech production. During this phase, 
speakers realized their communicative intent by generating the propositional 
representation of speech contents and the imagistic representation of co-speech gesture 
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contents. Some versions of the Lexical Retrieval Hypothesis (Butterworth & Hadar, 1988) 
proposed that co-speech gestures are generated during the formulating phase (Levelt, 
1989) of speech production. During this phase, speakers select lexical items from their 
mental lexicons, and co-speech gestures are generated from the semantic features of these 
lexical items (e.g., forms, directions, locations). Although these hypotheses disagree on 
which stage of the speech production process is responsible for generating co-speech 
gestures, they all hold that the generation of co-speech gestures is inseparable from the 
speech production process.  
The close interaction between co-speech gestures and speech does not necessarily 
mean that co-speech gestures have to be solely generated from the speech production 
process. It has been repeatedly shown that gestures can express information that differs 
from or even contradicts the information expressed in speech (see Goldin-Meadow & 
Alibali, 2013, for a review). This discrepancy between the content of co-speech gestures 
and speech suggests that co-speech gestures, at least sometimes, may be generated from a 
process that is not part of the speech production process. Some researchers hypothesized 
that this process is the action generation process, which is responsible for generating 
purposeful actions that have a direct physical impact on the world, such as manipulating 
an object or locomotion (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008; Kita, 2000; Kita & Özyürek, 2003; 
Kita, 2014). Co-speech gestures are the representational use of such actions. We call this 
hypothesis the action generation hypothesis.  According to this hypothesis, action-related 
representations are constantly activated in working memory when we speak. These 
representations automatically activate the action generation system, which generates 
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plans for appropriate actions. Co-speech gestures arise from these action plans. They are 
the representational use of actions because they do not interact with the physical world.  
There has been some evidence for a close link between co-speech gestures and 
actions. For example, participants produce more co-speech gestures when they describe 
manipulable items (e.g. scissors) than when they describe non-manipulable items (e.g., 
fish; Pine, Gurney, & Fletcher, 2010; see also Feyereisen & Havard, 1999). In Hosttetter 
and Alibali (2010), participants were asked to describe patterns of dots and shapes either 
after they physically constructed the patterns with wooden sticks or after they viewed the 
patterns on a computer screen. Participants produce representational gestures at a higher 
rate when they have physically constructed the patterns than when they have only viewed 
the patterns. Results from these two studies are consistent with the action generation 
hypothesis because they show that action generation potential (Pine et al., 2010) or action 
generation experience (Hostetter & Alibali, 2010) can increase the production of co-
speech gestures. However, in Pine et al. (2010) and Feyereisen and Havard (1999), the 
speech contents were different when participants described the manipulable and the non-
manipulable items. Hosttetter and Alibali (2010) did not report whether speech 
production differed between the action and the viewing conditions. Therefore, it remains 
unclear whether the differences in gesture production between conditions were due to 
differences in the involvement of the action generation system or due to differences in 
speech content between conditions.   
The action generation hypothesis is further supported by a study in which speech 
content was controlled (Cook & Tanenhaus, 2009). Participants were asked to solve a 
Tower of Hanoi problem either by moving real objects with their hands or by moving 
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objects on a computer screen with a mouse. They then described their solutions to a 
listener who would be solving the same problems later. Participants who solved the 
problem with real objects produced more gestures with grasping hand shapes and more 
gestures with higher and more curved trajectories than those who solved the 
computerized version of the problem. Importantly, the two groups used similar verbal 
descriptions. These results are consistent with the action generation hypothesis because 
specific action information was only reflected in speakers’ co-speech gestures, but was 
not reflected in their concurrent speech. However, in this study participants could see 
their own actions during the problem-solving phase, so it is possible that the different 
forms of gestures in the two conditions may be due to different visuo-spatial (non-
actional) representations rather than different actional representations. Thus, this study 
does not provide clear evidence that gestures' underlying representations are inherently 
actional. 
To provide stronger support for the action generation hypothesis, we examined 
whether the frequency of co-speech gestures can be automatically affected by the 
properties of referent objects that are relevant to actions but not to speech. We 
manipulated the affordances of the stimulus object (mugs) by either presenting mugs with 
smooth surface or mugs with spiky surface. We elicited co-speech gestures by instructing 
participants to think aloud as they completed mental rotation of these mugs. We did not 
give participants any action task before this task. We then examined the effect of 
affordances (spiky vs. smooth) on participants’ gesture rates.  
Affordances are properties of an object that suggest how it can be acted upon (e.g., 
Norman, 1988). Evidence showed that affordances of objects such as their location, shape 
Running head: CO-THOUGHT AND CO-SPEECH GESTURES                            7 
 
 
and orientation lead to different reaching and grasping actions (e.g., Tucker & Ellis, 1998; 
Ellis & Tucker, 2000). According to the action generation hypothesis, participants should 
produce co-speech gestures less frequently when the stimulus object has a spiky surface 
than when it has a smooth surface, as objects with smooth surfaces afford action more 
strongly. In contrast, the speech production hypothesis predicts that the affordances of the 
stimulus objects should not affect the frequency of co-speech gestures because the 
affordances should not influence speech production. 
In addition to co-speech gestures, people also spontaneously gesture when they 
solve problems during silent thinking (co-thought gestures). When people silently solve 
mental rotation problems in a non-communicative setting (e.g., when they are left alone 
and are recorded by a hidden camera), they spontaneously produced co-thought gestures, 
which simulated the manipulation or the rotation of the stimulus object (Chu and Kita, 
2008, 2011). For example, they rotate their hands with the index finger and thumb 
opposed, as if to grasp and rotate the object. They also rotate their right index finger, as if 
to simulate the rotation of the object. Compared to co-speech gestures, co-thought 
gestures are much less well understood. The mechanism underlying the production of co-
thought gestures remains largely unknown. The action generation hypothesis proposes 
that both co-speech and co-thought gestures are generated from the representational use 
of the action generation process. According to this hypothesis, the production of both co-
speech and co-thought gestures should be affected by factors that influence the action 
generation process and there should be a systematic relationship between these two types 
of gestures.  
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There is evidence that co-thought and co-speech gestures share many properties, 
suggesting that the co-thought and co-speech gestures are generated by a common 
mechanism. People produce more co-speech gestures when speech production is more 
difficult than when it is less difficult (e.g., Kita & Davies, 2009, Melinger & Kita, 2007, 
Hostetter, Alibali & Kita, 2007, Rauscher, Krauss & Chen, 1996; Wesp, Hesse, 
Keutmann & Wheaton, 2001). They produce more co-thought gestures when silent 
problem-solving task is more difficult than when it is less difficult (e.g., Chu & Kita, 
2011). Gesture rates dropped  over the course of experiments, both when participants 
silently solved mental rotation problems (co-thought gestures) and when they verbally 
described their solutions to these problems (co-speech gesture; Chu & Kita, 2008).The 
representational content of both co-speech and co-thought gestures also changed from 
more object-anchored forms to less object-anchored forms over time (Chu & Kita, 2008). 
Suppressing both co-speech and co-thought gestures led to less frequent use of imagined 
physical movements of objects in the problem-solving strategy (Alibali, Spencer, Knox, 
& Kita, 2011). Although these parallel findings are compatible with the idea of a 
common mechanism for the production of co-speech and co-thought gestures, none of 
these studies directly examined the relationship between co-thought and co-speech 
gestures within the same individual. Furthermore, although co-thought gestures in these 
studies were produced in silence, people might have produced inner speech with their co-
thought gestures. It is possible that the parallel findings between the co-thought and co-
speech gestures were because that both types of gestures were produced with similar 
speech (covert and overt speech). To eliminate this alternative explanation, the present 
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study elicited co-thought gestures in a non-communicative task where speech production 
was suppressed by a simultaneous verbal shadowing task.  
To summarize, the goal of the present study is to investigate the relationship of co-
thought and co-speech gestures within the same individual and test the action generation 
hypothesis by examining whether both co-thought and co-speech gestures are affected by 
the affordances of the stimulus objects. In Experiment 1, we elicited co-thought gestures 
using a mental rotation task and co-speech gestures using a motion event description task. 
If both types of gestures are generated from the representational use of the action 
generation process, such as simulating the manipulation of stimulus objects or simulating 
the movements of stimulus objects, participants who produce co-thought gestures more 
frequently should also produce co-speech gestures more frequently than those who 
produce co-thought gestures less frequently. Experiment 2 sought to replicate the 
correlation found in Experiment 1 and rule out the possibility that the correlation was due 
to participants generating inner speech during co-thought gesture production. However, a 
positive correlation between co-thought and co-speech gestures can only be indirect 
support for the action generation hypothesis, because the positive correlation can be 
attributed to other non-action related factors as well. Experiment 3 and 4 sought to 
provide direct evidence for the action generation hypothesis by examining how action-
related physical properties, namely the affordances of the stimulus objects affect the 
frequency of co-thought and co-speech gestures. We asked participants to solve a mental 
rotation task with a simultaneous verbal shadowing task to elicit co-thought gestures 
(Experiment 3) and to verbally explain their solution of a mental rotation task, to elicit 
co-speech gestures (Experiment 4). According to the action generation hypothesis, 
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participants should produce both co-thought and co-speech gestures more often when the 
stimulus objects afford action more strongly than when they are less likely to afford 
action. 
Experiment 1 
The main goal was to examine whether the rates of co-speech gestures correlated 
with the rates of co-thought gestures within the same individuals. If the two types of 
gestures are generated from the representational use of the action generation process, they 
should be positively correlated.  
We also examined whether the rates of co-speech and co-thought gestures 
correlated with participants’ rates of self-touches (e.g., scratching one’s own body). This 
tested whether a positive correlation between the rates of co-thought and co-speech 
gestures was due to variations in the general tendency of moving one’s hands while 
speaking or solving problems. In other words, people who are generally more likely to 
move their hands might produce both gestures and self-touch more often. If this were the 
case, people who produce co-thought and co-speech gestures very frequently should also 
produce self-touches very often. In contrast, if the positive correlation between the rates 
of co-thought and co-speech gestures was due to the representational use of the action 
generation process, there should not be any relationship between rates of self-touches and  
rates of the two types of gestures, because self-touches are not generated for 
representational purposes.  
People spontaneously produce gestures not only when they talk to other people 
face-to-face, but also when they speak alone (Bavelas, Gerwing, Sutton, & Prevost, 2008; 
Cohen, 1977). Speakers gesture more often when speaking to a listener face-to-face than 
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when speaking alone (Cohen, 1977; Krauss, Dushay, Chen, & Rauscher, 1995; but see 
Bavelas & Healing, 2013 for a review). It is possible that gestures produced in these two 
situations may be generated from different mechanisms. For example, gestures produced 
in a face-to-face conversation may originate from communicative intent, whereas those 
produced alone may originate from non-communicative processes. Thus, the Sketch 
model (de Ruiter, 2000; de Ruiter & de Beer, 2013), which hypothesized that co-speech 
gestures originate from communicative intent, may predict that the frequency of co-
thought gestures may correlate with the frequency of co-speech gestures produced in the 
speaking-alone situation, but not with the frequency of co-speech gestures produced in 
the face-to-face conversation. However, according to the action generation hypothesis, 
gestures are generated from the representational use of the action generation process 
regardless whether they are produced during silent problem-solving, in a face-to-face 
communication, or in a speak-alone situation. Thus, the rates of co-speech gesture 
produced in both situations should positively correlate with the rates of co-thought 
gestures.  
Method 
Participants.    The participants were 41 native English speakers (37 female, 
mean age: 19 years old, age range: 18 - 28) from the University of Birmingham. All had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They received course credits for their participation. 
 Mental rotation task.    We elicited co-thought gestures by asking participant to 
solve a Shepard and Metzler (1971) type mental rotation task (see Figure 1 for an 
example and see supplemental materials for all stimuli). Each stimulus consisted of two 
three-dimensional objects presented at the top of the screen and one presented at the 
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bottom of the screen. The two upper objects were mirror images of each other on the 
vertical axis. They were always in the canonical position in the sense that their sides were 
parallel to the horizontal axis, the vertical axis, or the axis pointing to depth. The lower 
object was rotated from the upper left object in half of trials and from the upper right 
object in the other half of trials. The lower object was rotated by four angles (60°, 120°, 
240° and 300°) around the bisector that went through the object’s center between the 
horizontal and vertical axis (XY axis), the horizontal and in-depth axis (XZ axis), and the 
vertical and in-depth axis (YZ axis). There were 24 experimental trials (left vs. right × 4 
angles × 3 axes) and no practice trials. Stimuli were presented randomly. 
Participants were asked to decide whether or not the lower object was rotated 
from the upper left or right object. In each trial, they first saw a white fixation cross in the 
center of the screen for 1000 ms and then the stimulus. As soon as they gave a response, 
the next trial started. They responded with two foot pedals, leaving their hands free for 
spontaneous gestures. They were told that accuracy was more important than speed so 
that spontaneous gestures were not suppressed due to time pressure. They were not told 
anything about gesture in the instructions. No feedback was given concerning the 
accuracy of their response. To maximally reduce the impact of the communicative 
environment, the experimenter left the room before the experiment started, and 
participants were left alone in the testing room. Their behaviour was recorded by a 
hidden camera (Sony DCR–HC19E PAL camcorder at 25 frames per second).  
Motion event description task.    We elicited co-speech gestures by asking 
participants to recount eight movie clips depicting movements of two geometric shapes 
(see supplemental materials). Each video clip was four seconds long. Each participant 
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described half of the clips in a face-to-face condition and the other half in a tape-recorder 
condition. In the face-to-face condition, the participant described the motion events to the 
experimenter sitting opposite the participant. The participants’ behaviour was recorded 
by a video camera (Sony DCR–HC19E PAL camcorder at 25 frames per second), which 
was placed next to the experimenter and was visible to the participants. In the tape-
recorder condition, participants were left alone in the room and described the motion 
events to a tape recorder. Their behaviour was video-recorded by a hidden camera (Sony 
DCR–HC19E PAL camcorder at 25 frames per second). There were no practice trials. 
General Procedure.    Participants were tested individually. They filled out the 
informed consent form, completed the mental rotation task, completed half of the motion 
event description task either in the face-to-face condition or in the tape-recorder condition, 
filled in personality questionnaires for about 30 minutes, and completed the other half of 
the motion event description task in the other condition. The questionnaire data were 
collected for a different study and are not reported in this paper. The order of the two 
conditions was counterbalanced across participants. After the participant completed the 
experiment, they were debriefed about the hidden video camera and its purpose and were 
given the opportunity to request erasing the recording. None of them reported awareness 
of the hidden camera. None of them requested to have their video data erased. 
Gesture & self-touch coding.    Gesture coding was carried out with video 
annotation software ELAN (European Distributed Corpora Project [EUDICO] Linguistic 
Annotator), developed by the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics. Gestures were 
segmented according to the procedure described in Kita, Van Gijn, and Van der Hulst 
(1998). Each gesture was either categorized as a representational gesture or as a non-
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representational gesture (on the basis of the classification system outlined in McNeill, 
1992). Representational gestures are used to depict hand actions with objects, to represent 
physical properties or movements of objects, or to point to an object or a location. For 
example, in the mental rotation task, if a gesture was used to simulate manipulation of the 
stimulus object, to represent the rotation of the stimulus object, or to point to the stimulus 
object, it would be counted as a representational gesture. In the motion event description 
task, if a gesture was used to depict the shape of a stimulus object, to represent the 
manner and the path of a motion, or to point to an object or location, it would be counted 
as a representational gesture. Non-representational gestures included the following types 
of gestures: emblem or interactive gestures conveying conventionalized meanings, such 
as “maybe” (e.g., a flat hand with the palm down, wavering), “you know” (e.g., a flat 
hand with the palm up, possibly with a shoulder shrug); beat gestures were small, baton-
like gestures produced along with the rhythm of speech to emphasize information; 
unclear gestures were gestures that could not be placed in any of the above categories. 
Self-touches (also called "self-adaptors", Ekman & Friesen, 1969) or “body-
focused movements” (Freedman, O'Hanoln, Oltman, & Witkin, 1972) were classified as 
hand movements that touched one’s own body or its adornments. Self-touches did not 
convey any information related to the speaking task or the mental rotation task. 
To establish inter-coder reliability of gesture classification, a second independent 
coder classified the hand movements of eleven randomly selected participants (23% of all 
hand movements in the mental rotation task; 22% of all hand movements in the face-to-
face condition of the motion event description task; 22% of all hand movements in the 
tape-recorder condition of the motion event description task). The two coders' 
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categorizations of representational, non-representational gestures, and self-touches 
matched on 98% of all hand movements (Cohen’s k = 0.94, p < .001). To establish inter-
coder reliability of gesture and self-touch identification, a third independent coder 
identified gestures and self-touches of the same eleven randomly selected participants. 
Among the gestures and self-touches that were identified by both coders, 97% of the 
original coder’s gestures and 85% of the original coder’s self-touches temporally 
overlapped with those identified by the third coder.   
Results and Discussion 
 In the mental rotation task, participants produced 290 representational gestures, 
34 non-representational gestures, and 501 self-touches. Twenty-five participants 
produced at least one representational gesture in the mental rotation task. In the motion 
event description task, they produced 756 representational gestures, 8 non-
representational gestures, and 131 self-touches in the face-to-face condition; they 
produced 533 representational gestures, 8 non-representational gestures, and 160 self-
touches in the tape-recorder condition. Fourty participants produced at least one 
representational gesture in the face-to-face condition and 36 participants produced at least 
one representational gesture in the tape-recorder condition. 
We defined gesture rates as the number of gestures per minute. We used 
Spearman’s rho for all correlation analyses because the distributions of co-thought 
gesture rates (Skewness = 2.85) and self-touch rates (Skewness = 1.50) in the mental 
rotation task were highly skewed (ps < .050).  
We first examined the correlation between the rates of co-thought and co-speech 
gestures. To avoid influences of outliers, we excluded two participants whose gesture 
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rates were more than 2.5 standard deviations in the mental rotation task. No participants’ 
gestures rates exceeded 2.5 standard deviations in the face-to-face or the tape-recorder 
condition of the motion event description task.  
People who produced co-thought gestures more often also produced co-speech 
gestures more frequently, both in the face-to-face condition rho (37) = .49, p = .001 and 
in the tape-recorder condition rho (37) = .43, p = .009 (see Figure 2 for the scatter plots 
for the correlations).  
We then examined the correlation between the rates of gestures and self-touches. 
We excluded two additional participants for this analysis. One participant’s self-touch 
rates were more than 2.5 standard deviations in the mental rotation task and another 
participant’s self-touch rates were more than 2.5 standard deviations in the face-to-face 
condition of the motion event description task. No participants’ gestures rates exceeded 
2.5 standard deviations in the tape-recorder condition of the motion event description task.  
There was no correlation between the rates of self-touches in the mental rotation 
task and the rates of co-speech gestures in the motion event description task (in the face-
to-face condition: rho (35) = -.10, p = .549; in the tape-recorder condition: rho (35) = -.07, 
p = .671). Similarly, there was no correlation between the rates of co-thought gesture in 
the mental rotation task and the rates of self-touches in the motion event description task 
(in the face-to-face condition: rho (35) = .16, p = .333; in the tape-recorder condition: rho 
(35) = -.07, p = .680). Furthermore, the rates of self-touch and gesture did not correlate in 
the mental rotation task (rho (35) = -.07, p = .664), in the face-to-face condition of the 
motion event description task (rho (35) = -.23, p = .166), or in the tape-recorder condition 
of the motion event description task (rho (35) = -.27, p = .112). 
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People who produced self-touch more often in the mental rotation task also 
produce self-touches more frequently in the motion event description task (in the face-to-
face condition: rho (37) = .47, p < .01; in the tape-recorder condition: rho (37) = .30, p 
= .061). 
The outlier exclusion was not crucial for the above results. Statistical significance 
or non-significance for all correlations for this experiment remained the same even if we 
included the outliers. 
The positive correlation between the rates of co-thought and co-speech gestures is 
consistent with the idea that these two types of gestures are generated by a common 
mechanism. This common mechanism is unlikely to be a general tendency of moving 
one’s hands while speaking or solving problems because the rate of self-touches did not 
correlate with the rates of gestures. This mechanism is also unlikely to be a part of the 
speech production process (e.g., Butterworth & Hadar, 1989; De Ruiter, 2000; McNeill, 
1992) because co-thought gestures were produced in a non-speaking mental rotation task.  
However, one could argue that the correlation between co-thought and co-speech 
gestures could be attributed to the possibility that co-thought gestures were triggered by 
inner speech when participants solved the mental rotation task. We aimed to rule out this 
possibility in Experiment 2.  
Experiment 2 
 The goal was to replicate the positive correlation between the rates of co-thought 
and co-speech gestures, whilst also eliminating any possible inner speech when 
participants produced co-thought gestures. This was done by asking participants to count 
from one to five repeatedly while solving the mental rotation task. If both co-thought and 
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co-speech gestures are generated from the representational use of the action generation 
process, suppressing speech production in the mental rotation task should not affect the 
positive correlation between the rates of co-thought and co-speech gestures. 
Method 
Participants.    The participants were 22 native English speakers (15 female, 
mean age: 21 years old, age range: 18 - 27) from the University of Birmingham. All had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They were awarded course credits for their 
participation. 
Mental rotation task.    Participants completed the same  mental rotation task as 
in Experiment 1,  except that while solving the mental rotation problems, they was asked 
to  simultaneously count from one to five aloud repeatedly according to the beeps at 0.4 
second intervals heard through a headphone. Their behaviour was recorded by a hidden 
camera. 
Motion event description task.    The motion event description task was the 
same as the one used in Experiment 1. Participants' behaviour was recorded by a visible 
video camera in the face-to-face condition and by a hidden camera in the tape-recorder 
condition. 
General procedure.    The general procedure of Experiment 2 was the same as 
the one used in Experiment 1, except that participants were given the motion event 
description task immediately after the mental rotation task. 
Coding.    The gesture coding scheme were the same as the one used in 
Experiment 1. We did not code self-touches in this experiment. 
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To establish inter-coder reliability of gesture classification, a second independent 
coder classified the gestures of four randomly selected participants (23% of all hand 
movements in the face-to-face condition of the motion event description task; 29% of all 
hand movements in the tape-recorder condition of the motion event description task; 21% 
of all hand movements in the mental rotation task). The two coders' categorizations of 
representational and non-representational gestures matched on 98% of all gestures 
(Cohen’s k = 0.49, p < .001). To establish inter-coder reliability of gesture identification, 
a third independent coder identified gestures of the same four randomly selected 
participants. Among the gestures that were identified by both coders, 92% of the original 
coder’s gestures temporally overlapped with those identified by the third coder.   
Results and Discussion 
 In the mental rotation task, participants produced 89 representational gestures, and 
7 non-representational gestures. Fifteen participants produced at least one 
representational gesture in the mental rotation task. In the motion event description task, 
they produced 579 representational gestures and 4 non-representational gestures in the 
face-to-face condition and 418 representational gestures and 5 non-representational 
gestures in the tape-recorder condition. Twenty-one participants produced at least one 
representational gesture in the face-to-face condition and 20 participants produced at least 
one representational gesture in the tape-recorder condition. We calculated gesture rates 
by the number of gestures per minute.  
Suppressing speech did not affect how often people produced co-thought gestures. 
The rates of co-thought gestures in Experiment 2 (M = 1.03, SD = 1.12) was not 
significantly different from the rates of co-thought gestures in Experiment 1 (M = 1.23, 
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SD = 2.11), t (61) = -.40, p = .688. This suggests that co-thought gestures are unlikely to 
be generated from speech production processes. 
We used Spearman’s rho for all correlation analyses because the distribution of 
co-thought gesture rates in the mental rotation task was highly skewed (Skewness = 1.51, 
ps < .050). To avoid influences of outliers, we excluded one participant whose gesture 
rate was more than 2.5 standard deviations in the mental rotation task. No participants’ 
gestures rates exceeded 2.5 standard deviations in the face-to-face or the tape-recorder 
condition of the motion event description task. We replicated the findings of Experiment 
1: People who produced co-thought gestures more often in the mental rotation task also 
produce co-speech gestures more frequently in the motion event description task (in the 
face-to-face condition rho (19) = .70, p < .001; in the tape-recorder condition: rho (19) 
= .53, p = .014, see Figure 3 for the scatter plots for the correlations)
1
. This indicates that 
the positive correlation between the rates of the two types of gestures was unlikely to 
reflect triggering of co-thought gestures by inner speech. 
The outlier exclusion was not crucial for the above results. Statistical significance 
or non-significance for all correlations for this experiment remained the same even if we 
included the outliers. 
The positive correlation between the rates of co-thought and co-speech gestures is 
consistent with the action generation hypothesis that both types of gesture are generated 
from the representational use of the action generation process. However, correlations are 
only indirect evidence for the action generation hypothesis, because it is possible that co-
thought and co-speech gestures are generated by different processes, but that both 
processes are affected by common factors, such as the gesturer's spatial ability. Therefore, 
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in order to provide more direct evidence for the action generation hypothesis, we 
manipulated the factors that affect the action generation process and examined their effect 
on co-thought (Experiment 3) and co-speech gestures (Experiment 4). 
Experiment 3 
 The goal was to provide direct evidence that co-thought gestures are generated 
from the representational use of the action generation process. Participants were asked to 
solve the same mental rotation task as used in Experiment 1, except that the stimulus 
objects were either mugs with spikes on their surface (less likely to be acted upon) or 
mugs with smooth surfaces (more likely to be acted upon; see Figure 4). If co-thought 
gestures are generated from the representational use of the action generation process, they 
should be sensitive to the affordances of the stimulus object. We predicted that the rates 
of co-thought gestures would decrease when there were spikes on the surface of the 
stimulus objects as people should be less likely to act on objects with spiky surfaces than 
objects with smooth surfaces. 
Method 
Participants.    The participants were 24 native English speakers (19 female, 
mean age: 21 years old, age range: 18 - 25) from the University of Birmingham. All had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They were awarded course credits for their 
participation. 
Mental rotation task.    The mental rotation task was similar to the one used in 
Experiment 2 except for the use of new stimuli, which consisted of two types of mugs 
(see Figure 4 for an example and see supplemental materials for all stimuli). In the spiky 
mug condition, 14 spikes were added to the original mug pictures (four spikes on the 
Running head: CO-THOUGHT AND CO-SPEECH GESTURES                            22 
 
 
handle, five spikes on each side of the mug). In the smooth condition, the mugs were 
presented with no spikes.  
Participants were told that only one side of the mugs was painted in blue (note 
that the blue patch does not go all the way around the mugs in Figure 4). The handle of 
the upper left mug was on the left side of the blue surface, whereas the handle of the 
upper right mug was on the right side of the blue surface. Thus the two mugs on the 
upper screen were different from each other (i.e., the mirror image of each other).  
There were 48 experimental trials presented randomly (spiky vs. smooth × left vs. 
right × 4 angles × 3 axes) and there were no practice trials. Each condition consisted of 
24 trials. Participants solved mental rotation problems while counting simultaneously 
from one to five aloud repeatedly according to the beeps at 0.4 second intervals heard 
through a headphone. Their behaviour was recorded by a hidden video camera. 
General procedure.    The participants first completed the mental rotation task. 
They were told that surface differences (spikes vs. smooth) were irrelevant to the present 
study and should be ignored. The participants then rated the graspability of the smooth 
and the spiky mugs on a 1 to 5 scale (1 = least graspable; 5 = most graspable). 
Gesture Coding.    The gesture coding scheme was the same as the one used in 
Experiment 1. We did not code self-touches in this experiment.  
To establish inter-coder reliability of gesture classification, a second independent 
coder classified the gestures of four randomly selected participants (28% of all hand 
movements). The two coders' categorization of representational and non-representational 
gestures matched 99% of all gestures (Cohen’s k = 0.93, p < .001). To establish inter-
coder reliability of gesture identification, a third independent coder identified gestures of 
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the same four randomly selected participants. Among the gestures that were identified by 
both coders, 92% of the original coder’s gestures temporally overlapped with those 
identified by the third coder.  
Results and Discussion 
In total, participants produced 218 representational gestures and 32 non-
representational gestures. Twelve participants produced at least one representational 
gesture. Smooth mugs (M = 4.46, SD = 0.83) were rated as more likely to be acted upon 
than spiky mugs (M = 1.96, SD = 1.08), t (23) = 10.07, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 2.60.   
Participants’ gesture rates (i.e., number of gestures per minute) were higher in the 
smooth condition (M = 2.84, SD = 4.53) than in the spiky condition (M = 2.01, SD = 
3.01), t (23) = 2.12, p = .045, Cohen’s d = 0.22.  
Can the gesture rate difference between the two conditions be attributed to the 
difference in difficulty of the two conditions? It has been shown that people gesture more 
often when people solve difficult problems than when they solve easy ones (e.g., Chu & 
Kita, 2011; Hostetter, Alibali & Kita, 2007; Kita & Davies, 2009; Melinger & Kita, 
2007). However, the higher gesture rates in the smooth condition did not arise because 
people found smooth trials more difficult than spiky trials. On the contrary, perhaps 
because the spiky mugs were visually more complex than the smooth mugs were, 
participants found the spiky trials more difficult than the smooth trials. They needed 
longer RTs to solve each trial in the spiky condition (M = 3.35 seconds, SD = 1.47) than 
in the smooth condition (M = 2.90 seconds, SD = 0.98), t (23) = 3.05, p = .006, Cohen’s d 
= 0.36
2
. Furthermore, the difference in gesture rates between the spiky and the smooth 
condition did not correlate with the RT differences between the two conditions, rho (22) 
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= .01, p = .979. Error rates in the smooth condition (M = 0.15, SD = 0.17) did not differ 
from error rates in the spiky condition (M = 0.15, SD = 0.17), t (23) = -.46, p = .649
3
. 
Thus, the gesture rate difference cannot be attributed to the difference in difficulty 
between the two conditions.  
The analysis of individual differences in graspability ratings and gesture rates 
provided further evidence that objects affording an action elicited more gestures. Based 
on the differences in graspability ratings between the smooth and the spiky conditions 
(rating of the smooth mugs minus rating of the spiky mugs), we split participants at the 
median rating difference score (median rating difference = 3) into a high rating difference 
group (mean rating difference = 3.25,) and a low rating difference group (mean rating 
difference = 1.75,). Participants’ gesture rates differences between the two conditions 
(gesture rates in the smooth condition – gesture rates in the spiky condition) were larger 
in the high rating difference group (M = 1.62, SD = 2.38) than in the low rating difference 
group (M = 0.05, SD = 0.88), t (22) = 2.15, p = .043, Cohen’s d = 0.88.  
Our results showed that co-thought gestures were affected by affordances of 
stimuli objects in the same way that actions would be affected. Participants’ rating on 
affordances modulated the rates of their co-thought gestures. These results support the 
hypothesis that co-thought gestures are generated from the representational use of the 
action generation process. 
Experiment 4 
 The goal was to provide direct evidence that co-speech gestures are generated 
from the representational use of the action generation process. Participants were asked to 
explain their solution to a similar mental rotation task as used in Experiment 3. If co-
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speech gestures were generated from the representational use of the action generation 
process, people should produce co-speech gestures less often when they describe the 
rotation of spiky mugs than when they describe the rotation of smooth mugs.  
Method 
Participants.   The participants were 23 native English speakers (22 female, 
mean age: 19 years old, age range: 18 - 21) from the University of Birmingham. All had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They were awarded course credits for their 
participation. 
Mental rotation description task.    The stimuli were similar to those used in 
Experiment 3. Each stimulus display consisted of two same mugs at different orientations. 
The right mug was always in the canonical position. The left mug was rotated by four 
angles (60°, 120°, 240° and 300°) around the Cartesian rotational axes (horizontal, 
vertical, and depth). At each angle for each axis, we presented either spiky mugs or 
smooth mugs (see Figure 5 for an example and see supplemental materials for all stimuli). 
There were 24 trials (spiky vs. smooth × 4 angles × 3 axes) presented randomly.  
Participants were asked to describe how the left mug could be rotated to the 
position of the right one. They were asked to include the direction and angles of rotation 
in their description. They were told that surface differences (spikes vs. smooth) were 
irrelevant to the present study and should be ignored. They were also told that they were 
under no time pressure when solving the problems. The experimenter was seated to the 
left of the participants and pressed the space bar on the keyboard to start each trial. No 
feedback was given to the participants concerning the accuracy of their responses. Their 
behaviour was recorded by a visible video camera placed next to the experimenter. 
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General procedure.    The general procedure was the same as that used in 
Experiment 3. 
Gesture Coding.    The gesture coding scheme was the same as that used in 
Experiment 1. We did not code self-touches in this experiment. 
To establish inter-coder reliability of gesture classification, a second independent 
coder classified the gestures of three randomly selected participants (30% of all hand 
movements). The two coders' categorization of representational and non-representational 
gestures matched 98% of all gestures (Cohen’s k = 0.49, p < .001). To establish inter-
coder reliability of gesture identification, a third independent coder identified gestures of 
the same three randomly selected participants. Among the gestures that were identified 
by both coders, 95% of the original coder’s gestures temporally overlapped with those 
identified by the third coder.   
Results and Discussion 
Participants produced overall 277 representational gestures and 8 non-
representational gestures. Sixteen participants produced at least one representational 
gesture. Smooth mugs (M = 4.43, SD = 0.79) were rated as more likely to be acted upon 
than spiky mugs were (M = 2.52, SD = 0.99), t (22) = 6.50, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 2.13.  
Participants’ gesture rates (i.e., number of gestures per minute) were higher in the 
smooth condition (M = 3.74, SD = 5.17) than in the spiky condition (M = 2.81, SD = 
4.35), t (22) = 3.82, p = .001, Cohen’s d = 0.194.  
The higher gesture rates in the smooth condition did not arise because people 
found the smooth conditions more difficult than the spiky condition. The average number 
of words used in each trial, the average description duration in each trial, and the average 
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speech rates in each trial (i.e., number of words per minute) did not differ between the 
two conditions (see Table 1 for statistics)
5
. We did not measure description accuracy 
because participants were instructed to only estimate the rotation angle and thus the 
accuracy was not emphasized. 
We also examined whether the difference in gesture rates between the smooth and 
the spiky conditions was due to differences in the content of the verbal descriptions in the 
two conditions. We categorized the words used in participants’ description from all trials 
into either spatial words (e.g., left, clock-wise, thirty, degree), motoric words (e.g., turn, 
move, pull) or non-spatiomotoric words (e.g., you, will, mug; See Appendix for the 
exhaustive lists of the three types of words). We aggregated words from all participants 
and morphological variants (e.g., tilt vs. tilted vs. tilting).  
The number of times each word was used in the two conditions was positively and 
very strongly correlated for all three types of words (spatial words: rho (56) = .90, p 
< .001; motoric words: rho (17) = .75, p < .001; non-spatiomotoric words: rho (83) = .79, 
p < .001; see Figure 6 for the scatter plots). So, for example, if the word ‘left’ was used 
very often and the word ‘up’ was used only a few times in the smooth condition, this was 
the case in the spiky condition as well. 
The proportions of the spatial or motoric words out of all words did not differ 
between the two conditions. On average participants used 45% spatial words (SD = 0.10) 
and 10% motoric words (SD = 0.11) in the smooth condition and 46 % spatial words (SD 
= 0.05) and 10% motoric words (SD = 0.05) in the spiky condition (for spatial words: t 
(22) = -0.77, p = .452; for motoric words: t (22) = 0.35, p = .728).  
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We also carried out the same analysis of individual differences in graspability 
ratings and gesture rates as in Experiment 3. Based on the graspability rating differences 
between the smooth and the spiky conditions, we split participants at the median rating 
difference score (median rating difference = 2) into a high rating difference group (mean 
rating difference = 2.91, n = 11) and a low rating difference group (mean rating 
difference = 1, n = 12). Differences in participants’ gesture rates in the two conditions 
were marginally significantly larger in the high rating difference group (M = 1.26, SD = 
2.02) than in the low rating difference group (M = 0.02, SD = 0.89), t (21) = 1.93, p 
= .067. Thus, we found the same trend as in Experiment 3. 
Our results show that co-speech gestures were affected by affordances of stimuli 
objects in the same way as actions would be affected. By contrast, the verbal explanations 
were not affected by the manipulation of affordances. In addition, there was a trend that 
participants’ rating on affordance modulated the rates of their co-speech gestures. These 
results support the hypothesis that co-speech gestures are generated from the 
representational use of the action generation process. 
Further Analyses on the effect of object affordance on the production of three 
subtypes of representational gestures 
 We further categorized the representational gestures in Experiments 3 and 4 into 
three subtypes, based on the widely used gesture classification system used in McNeill 
(1992). The first subtype is character viewpoint gesture, which was used to simulate hand 
actions upon the stimulus object. The crucial criterion for this type of gestures was that 
the participants had to make a grasping or holding hand shape, e.g., the index finger and 
the thumb were opposed or the two palms were opposed, as if grasping or holding the 
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stimulus object. The second subtype was observer viewpoint gesture, which was used to 
represent physical properties or movements of the stimulus object without any grasping 
or holding hand shape, e.g., a flat hand representing the stimulus object rotated around 
the wrist or a hand with the extended index finger drew a circle in the air. The third 
subtype was deictic gesture, which was used to point to the stimulus object without 
showing any physical properties or movements of the stimulus object.  
 According to the action generation hypothesis, all subtypes of representational 
gestures are generated from the representational use of the action generation process, 
such as manipulating an object or locomotion. Thus, all three types should be used less 
frequently in the spiky condition than in the smooth. 
To establish inter-coder reliability of the classification of the three subtypes of 
representational gestures, a second independent coder classified the gestures from the 
same participants used for intercoder reliability check in Experiments 3 and 4. The two 
coders' categorization of character viewpoint, observer viewpoint and deictic gestures 
matched 96.79% of all gestures (Cohen’s k = 0.95, p < .001) in Experiment 3 and 
matched 94.95% of all gestures (Cohen’s k = 0.90, p < .001).  
In Experiment 3, out of 218 representational gestures, there were 103 character 
viewpoint gestures (47.25%), 70 observer viewpoint gestures (32.11%), and 45 deictic 
gestures (20.64%). In Experiment 4, out of 277 representational gestures, there were 73 
character viewpoint gestures (26.35%), 188 observer viewpoint gestures (67.87%), and 
16 deictic gestures (5.78%). 
We pooled the data from Experiments 3 and 4 to increase statistical power and 
examined the effect of stimulus affordance on the production of the three subtypes of 
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representational gestures. The rates of the three subtypes of representational gestures 
were respectively submitted to 2 × 2 ANOVA analysis with stimulus affordance (smooth 
vs. spiky mugs) as a within-participant factor and experiment (Experiment 3 vs. 
Experiment 4) as a between-participant factor. We only included participants who 
produced at least 1 representational gesture in these analyses (n = 12 in Experiment 3; n = 
16 in Experiment 4).  
For the rates of character view point gestures, there was a main effect of stimulus 
affordance (F (1, 26) = 7.32, p = .012, η2= 0.22); that is, the rates of character viewpoint 
gestures were higher in the smooth condition (M = 1.97, SD = 3.05) than in the spiky 
condition (M = 1.32, SD = 2.23). There was no main effect of Experiment (F (1, 26) = 
1.15, p = .294). There was no interaction between stimulus affordance and Experiment (F 
(1, 26) = 1.06, p = .312). 
For the rates of observer view point gestures, there was a main effect of stimulus 
affordance (F (1, 26) = 13.12, p = .001, η2= 0.34); that is, the rates of observer viewpoint 
gestures were higher in the smooth condition (M = 2.98, SD = 3.09) than in the spiky 
condition (M = 2.20, SD = 2.57). There was no main effect of Experiment (F (1, 26) = 
2.35, p = .137). There was no interaction between stimulus affordance and Experiment (F 
(1, 26) = 1.08, p = .308). 
For the rates of deictic gestures, there was no main effect of stimulus affordance 
(F (1, 26) = 0.42, p = .522). The rates of deictic gestures were only descriptively in the 
smooth condition (M = 0.59, SD = 1.36) than in the spiky condition (M = 0.51, SD = 
0.94). There was no main effect of Experiment (F (1, 26) = 3.28, p = .082). There was no 
interaction between stimulus affordance and Experiment (F (1, 26) = 1.01, p = .325). 
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To summarize, the rates of character and observer viewpoint gestures were higher 
in the smooth condition than in the spiky condition. This was the case for both co-thought 
gestures elicited in Experiment 3 and co-speech gestures elicited in Experiment 4. The 
affordance of the stimulus objects did affect the production of the character and observer 
viewpoint gestures. Therefore, the character and observer viewpoint gestures in the 
present study are generated from the representational use of the action generation process. 
However, stimulus affordance did not affect the production of deictic gestures because 
the rates of deictic gestures were not significantly different between the smooth and the 
spiky conditions. Thus, it is unclear whether deictic gestures are generated from the 
representational use of the action generation process or from other processes (e.g., the 
speech production process).  
General Discussion 
Summary 
 The goal of the present study was to examine the relationship between co-speech 
and co-thought gestures, and to test the action generation hypothesis, which claims that 
both co-speech and co-thought gestures are generated from the representational use of the 
action generation process.  
Experiment 1 and 2 showed that participants who produced co-thought gestures 
more frequently in a silent mental rotation task also produced co-speech gestures in a 
motion event description task more frequently. This positive correlation is unlikely to be 
due to individuals’ general tendency to move their hands when talking or solving 
problems because their rates of self-touches did not correlate with gesture rates 
(Experiment 1). The positive correlation is unlikely to be attributed to the possibility that 
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co-thought gestures were triggered by inner speech, as the correlation was still observed 
when co-thought gestures were elicited during a non-communicative mental rotation task 
with a simultaneous verbal suppression task (Experiment 2).  
The positive correlation between the co-thought and co-speech gestures is 
consistent with the action generation hypothesis that they are both generated from the 
representational use of the action generation process. The positive correlation between 
the two types of gestures is less consistent with the speech production hypothesis because 
co-thought gestures were unlikely to be generated from the speech production process.  
 Experiment 3 and 4 showed that co-thought and co-speech gestures are similar to 
real action (object manipulation) in terms of their response to object affordance. That is, 
people produced both co-thought and co-speech gestures less frequently when the 
stimulus objects were spiky mugs than when they were smooth mugs. The object 
affordances modulated production of both types of gesture in the same way they 
modulated actions: People tended not to act upon spiky objects. The lower gesture rates 
in the spiky condition than in the smooth condition cannot be attributed to differences in 
problem-solving difficulty across conditions (Experiment 3) or differences in speech 
content across conditions (Experiment 4). The idea that affordances influenced gesture 
rates was further supported by the correlational results that participants with a larger 
difference in graspability ratings (spiky = less graspable) showed a bigger affordance 
effect on gesture rates (spiky = lower gesture rates). These findings strongly suggest that 
co-thought and co-speech gestures are both generated from the representational use of the 
action generation process, which automatically takes into account whether or not a mug 
was spiky. Our results are in line with the finding that speakers encode action information 
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in their co-speech gestures, but not in their concurrent speech (Cook & Tanenhaus, 2009) 
and that speakers gesture more often when describing patterns they have physically 
constructed than when describing patterns they have only viewed (Hostetter & Alibali, 
2010). Our results, however, go beyond previous findings because the affordance effect 
on the gesture rate in our experiments cannot be attributed to differences in prior visual 
experiences of gesturally depicted actions (Cook & Tanenhaus, 2009) or speech content 
(Hostetter & Alibali, 2010). More importantly, our results are not in accordance with the 
speech production hypothesis that co-speech gestures are generated from the speech 
production process.  
Comparison of the action generation hypothesis with other hypotheses  
The action generation hypothesis is in conflict with the speech production 
hypotheses that the generation of gesture is inseparable from the speech production 
processes. For example, according to the Growth Point Theory (McNeill, 1992, 2005), 
gesture and speech originate from a growth point that is an irreducible, minimal unit that 
combines imagery and linguistic categorical content. This hypothesis implies that the 
generation of gesture is inseparable from speech because gestures are not based solely on 
visuospatial imagery, but based on imagery that is, at the same time, a linguistic category, 
which will manifest itself as both a gesture and words. In addition, the Sketch Model 
hypothesis (De Ruiter, 2000) argues that gestures and speech originate from the same 
communicative intention generated for speaking; the Lexical Access Model (Butterworth 
& Hadar, 1988) proposes that gestures are produced from semantic representation of 
words retrieved for speech production. None of these hypotheses can explain why the 
affordance of stimulus objects should affect gesture production when the same affordance 
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does not affect speech content. Information about affordance was not part of the speakers’ 
communicative intent because participants only describe the rotation direction and angle 
of the stimulus object without mentioning the spikes in their description.  
The action generation hypothesis is compatible with the Information Packaging 
Hypothesis (Kita, 2000; also named as the Interface Model in Kita & Özyürek, 2003) and 
the gesture-as-simulated-action framework (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008). Both of them 
claim that gestures are “actions in the virtual environment” (Kita, 2000, p. 165) or “a 
natural expression of the simulated actions” (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008, p. 504). However, 
both hypotheses only address the origin of co-speech gestures and neither of them 
discusses the origin of co-thought gestures. The action generation hypothesis argues that 
both co-thought and co-speech gestures originated from the same mechanism: that is, the 
representational use of the action generation process. This claim has been supported by 
the findings that there is a positive correlation between the two types of gestures and both 
of them are affected by object affordances. This study for the first time provides direct 
empirical evidence about the relationship between co-speech and co-thought gestures. 
It is worth pointing out that results of the current study indicates that gestures can 
be generated from the action generation process but they cannot tell us whether gesture 
can support the action generation process. To investigate the function of gesture, one 
needs to manipulate the availability of gesture and measure the effect of the action 
generation process. However, we will not be surprised if gesture facilitates the action-
generation process or supports other non-linguistic cognitive processes (e.g., Alibali, 
Spencer, Knox & Kita, 2011; Chu & Kita, 2011; Pouw et al, 2014).  
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It is also worth mentioning that the action generation hypothesis does not deny the 
existence of close interaction between the gesture and speech production systems. It has 
been clearly shown that the interaction between gesture and speech can occur during both 
their planning and execution phases (e.g., Chu & Hagoort, 2014; Kita & Özyürek, 2003).  
In addition, the action generation hypothesis and the speech production process 
may not be mutually exclusive. A gesture could be generated both from the action 
generation process and the speech generation process because the speech production 
process may also recruit the action-generation process. For example, when describing a 
cutting action, the speaker may perform a cutting gesture while saying the word “cut”. In 
this case, both the gesture and the speech could originate from the cutting action 
generation process (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008). However, in Experiment 4, affordances of 
the mugs were irrelevant to speech production and were not mentioned in participants’ 
speech at all. The effect of mug affordance on gesture rates was unlikely to be caused by 
speech-generation processes. Thus, results of Experiment 4 clearly argue against the 
hypotheses that co-speech gestures were solely generated from the speech production 
process.  
Are all gestures generated from the representational use of the action generation 
process?   
 In the current study, representational gestures consisted of three subtypes of 
gestures, including character viewpoint gesture, observer viewpoint gesture and deictic 
gesture. The results showed that action related factors (e.g., affordance) affected not only 
those gestures that enact hand actions (character viewpoint gestures) but also those 
gestures that represent object motions and properties (observer viewpoint gestures). The 
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rates of deictic gestures did not differ between the smooth and the spiky conditions. This 
is perhaps due to the floor effect, in other words, because deictic gestures were infrequent 
in Experiments 3 and 4. Thus, the present study does not provide any direct evidence on 
whether deictic gestures are generated from the action generation process or the speech 
production process.  
However, we speculate that deictic gestures might also be generated from the 
representational use of the action generation process because participants who produced 
deictic gestures more often also produced the other two types of representational gestures 
more frequently. The rates of deictic gestures were significantly positively correlated 
with the rates of non-deictic representational gestures (the combination of character 
viewpoint gestures and observer viewpoint gestures) in both Experiments 3 and 4 
(Spearman's correlation, Experiment 3: rho (22) = .60, p = .002; Experiment 4: rho (21) 
= .48, p = .021). To draw firm conclusions on deictic gestures, future studies should use a 
task that can elicit more deictic gestures and examine the effect of stimulus affordance on 
the rates of deictic gestures.   
Does our conclusion extend to gestures that metaphorically express abstract 
contents?  People also gesture when talking about abstract concepts (McNeill, 1992). For 
example, when explaining the concept of conflict, speakers may move their hands toward 
each other as if the two hands, each holding an object, bang the two objects with each 
other (see Kita, Condappa, & Mohr, 2008 and Cienki & Müller, 2008 for more examples). 
Concrete and abstract concepts share common situational content, such as information 
about agents, objects, events (Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005) and we understand 
abstract concepts in terms of image schemas based on concrete bodily experiences, 
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including actions (Johnson, 1987). Although the present study did not directly examine 
metaphorical gestures depicting abstract concepts, it is possible that these gestures are 
also generated from the representational use of the action generation process. 
 In addition to representational gestures, people also produce other types of 
gestures. These gestures include beat gestures (simple and rhythmic movements 
emphasizing the prosody or structure of speech without depicting semantic content 
related to speech), interactive gestures (movements used to manage the interaction 
between the speaker and the listener, such as an palm-up-open-hand gesture produced 
with “maybe” to show uncertainty) and emblem gestures (movements with specific 
meaning that are agreed within a community, such as an OK sign). These gestures are 
unlikely to be generated from the action generation processes. Further research needs to 
be done to study the origin of these gestures. 
Limitations   
 One limitation of the current study is that the gestures observed in Experiments 3 
and 4 were elicited by tasks with everyday manipulable objects (i.e., mugs) as stimulus 
objects. We used manipulable stimulus objects to maximize the chance of eliciting 
spontaneous gestures. However, one might argue that gestures elicited in Experiments 3 
and 4 were more likely to be affected by action related factors, such as object affordances 
than objects that are not familiar (abstract 3-dimension objects) or not manipulable 
(houses, clouds). Future studies should explore to what extent present findings extend to 
other types of objects. Notwithstanding this limitation, the conclusion of the present study 
is clear: at least some co-speech and co-thought gestures are generated from the action 
generation process, but not from the speech generation process.  
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Furthermore, one might argue that the lower gesture rates in the spiky condition 
than in the smooth condition were due to differences in visual complexity between the 
two conditions rather than due to differences in object affordances. Although the current 
study cannot rule out this possibility, it seems unlikely. Previous evidence has shown that 
people gesture more when describing visually more complex diagrams than when 
describing simple diagrams (Kita & Davies, 2009). In the present study, participants 
gestured more in the smooth condition (visually less complex) than in the spiky condition 
(visually more complex). Furthermore, in the current study, individual differences in 
graspability ratings predicted individual differences in the effect size of the surface-type 
manipulation on gesture rates. This makes it less likely that visual complexity influenced 
gesture rates. It indicates that affordances had an impact on the gesture rate. 
Conclusion 
 In sum, the present study provides both correlational and experimental evidence 
that, at least some co-speech as well as co-thought gestures are generated from the 
representational use of the action generation process. Whether or not to gesture is not 
only affected by what we are going to say but also by how our hands interact with the 
physical world.    
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Appendix 
Non-
spatiomotoric 
words 
a, about, actually, again, and, as, be, bit, blue, but, by, can, case, certain, 
cup, dear, do, ehm, even, get, guess, handle, hard, have, how, I, instead, it, 
just, keep, know, leave, less, like, look, lot, many, matter, maybe, me, mean, 
more, motion, mug, nearly, need, no, not, of, oh, okay, or, possible, 
probably, quite, really, say, see, should, simple, so, some, something, sorry, 
sort, stages, than, that, the, them, then, thing, think, this, until, us, wait, way, 
well, which, whole, will, with, yeah, you   
Spatial words anti-clockwise, around, at, away, back, backwards, behind, bottom, 
clockwise, counter, degree, down, downwards, eight, eighty, fifteen, fifty, 
fifty-five, five, forty, forty-five, forward, from, hundred, in, left, leftwards, 
leftways, nine, ninety, ninety-five, on, one, over, right, rightwards, 
rightways, round, seventy, seventy-five, side, sixty, surface, ten, thirty, 
thirty-five, three, to, top, towards, twenty, twenty-five, two, up, upside, 
upwards, vertically, zero       
  
Motoric 
words 
bend, bring, come, facing, flip, going, hold, lift, move, pointing, pull, put, 
rotate, spin, take, tilt, tip, turn, twist      
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Footnotes 
1
The rates of co-thought and co-speech gestures were still positive correlated even 
after excluding the participants who did not produce any co-thought gestures in the 
mental rotation task. Statistical analyses are included in the supplemental materials. 
2 
RTs in this experiment were calculated from the correct trials without any 
representational gesture. Including the trials with representational gestures did not change 
the results. 
3
Error rates in this experiment were calculated from the trials without any 
representational gesture. Including these trials did not change the result. 
4
 The result remained the same when gesture rates were calculated by number of 
gestures per 100 words. Gesture rates were higher in the smooth condition (M = 5.43, SD 
= 7.42) than in the spiky condition (M = 4.31, SD = 6.68), t (22) = 3.41, p < .01, Cohen’s 
d = 0.16. 
5
These three variables were calculated from the trials without any representational 
gesture. Including these trials did not change the results. 
 
 
 
 
